Differentiate Mencius and Confucius Class in Human Nature Essay

Confucius’ view on human nature was not clearly and distinctly supplied in the Analects. It is no surprise that one of his disciples complained that â€Å"one cannot get to hear his view on human nature† (A, 5:13).1 In two passages of the Analects, Confucius classified men as belonging to three groups: â€Å"upper, middle and lower,† but as this classification was made according to man’s â€Å"learning ability† it had nothing to do with the common nature of man.2 Another two passages expressed more directly Confucius’ opinion in this respect. THE THEORY OF CONFUCIUS ON HUMAN NATURE Confucius’ view on human nature was not clearly and distinctly supplied in the Analects. It is no surprise that one of his disciples complained that â€Å"one cannot get to hear his view on human nature† (A, 5:13).1 In two passages of the Analects, Confucius classified men as belonging to three groups: â€Å"upper, middle and lower,† but as this classification was made according to man’s â€Å"learning ability† it had nothing to do with the common nature of man.2 Another two passages expressed more directly Confucius’ opinion in this respect. On the basis of Confucius’ teachings, Mencius and Hsà ¼n-tzu developed philosophies which sometimes were considered mutually complementary. As regards the theory of human nature, however, Mencius and Hsà ¼n-tzu obviously held incompatible views. The following discussion will try to show that Mencius’ theory of â€Å"human nature as good† is in fact a theory of â€Å"human heart as good,† and Hsà ¼n-tzu’s theory of â€Å"human nature as evil† is actually a theory of â€Å"human desire as evil.† These two theories are not necessarily contradictory, since they share the same underlying idea that human nature tends toward goodness. To clarify this point, we will lay more stress on the works of Mencius and the Chung-yung which directly elaborated on this idea than on those of Hsà ¼n-tzu and the I-chuan which accepted this idea in an implicit way. Mencius Etymologically, human â€Å"nature† (hsing) comes from â€Å"birth† or â€Å"to be born with† (sheng). The common understanding of this word in ancient China can be formulated as follows: â€Å"The inborn is what is meant by nature† (M, VI, A, 3).5 However, this consideration of the origin of nature exhibits only what a thing has rather than what a thing is: it expresses at most the sameness rather than the difference of all things. In order to determine what a thing is, it is necessary to know its essence: the genus plus the difference of species. This rule, made familiar by Aristotle, was true also for Mencius. First, Mencius was quite aware that in dealing with anything of the same kind, we must determine what this â€Å"same kind† means, and this is even more true when applied to man. Mencius said, â€Å"Now, things of the same kind are all alike. Why should we have doubts when it comes to man? The sage and I are of the same kind† (M, VI, A, 7). The wicked, however, also belong to the same kind. Thus, in determining the essence of human beings, we should find the difference of species. Mencius said, Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it. Shun understood the way of things and had a keen insight into human relations. He followed the path of benevolence and righteousness. He did not need to pursue benevolence and righteousness (M, IV, B,19). Clearly, the essence or the distinguishing feature of man must be understood through the â€Å"slight difference† between man and the brutes. The statement about Shun is an example that benevolence and righteousness are the interior path of man, following which will have a great effect. The implication of this whole sentence is probably that benevolence and righteousness belong to the â€Å"slight difference.†6 Another paragraph will also help clarify the distinguishing feature of man. â€Å"A gentleman differs from other men in what he retains in his heart–namely, benevolence and propriety† (M, IV, B, 28). Granted that the human essence of man can be described as benevolenc e, righteousness, propriety, etc., how can common people lose it? Can something be defined by a feature which can be lost? The key to the answer lies in the idea of â€Å"heart,† which is to be understood here as neither bodily heart, nor soul, but mind with sensitivity. Concerning human nature, Mencius presents his famous theory of â€Å"the four germs of the heart,† concluding as follows: From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human (M, II, A, 6). These four states of heart are named, in turn, the germs of â€Å"benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom† (M, II, A, 6) within man’s heart, which forms the difference of human beings. Human nature must be defined through this heart: Mencius said, â€Å"That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, is rooted in his heart† (M, VII, A, 21). Therefore the goodness of human nature resides in the goodness of the heart. A reservation, however, must be added, namely, that goodnes s exists only in the state of germ and needs to be retained, nourished, and developed. In this way Mencius demonstrated that human nature is tending toward goodness. He did not stop at this point, but continued to examine the nature and origin of the heart. Mencius affirmed that there is a propensity for development within the heart which makes it an â€Å"evaluating heart.† If this means an ability to be moral and human beings are moral agents,8 does not its propensity for development imply in some sense a â€Å"commanding heart†?9 It must be the case, then, that the evaluating heart is at the same time the commanding heart, for otherwise how could Mencius honor as gentleman those who â€Å"retain† it? Only with this understanding does it become meaningful to say that â€Å"there is nothing better for the nurturing of the heart than to reduce the number of one’s desires† (M, VII, B, 35). Only if the heart does more than evaluate can Mencius say, â€Å"The sole concern of learning is to go after this strayed heart. That is all† (M, VI, A, 11). On the basis of this double character of the heart, we can loo k further at the heart in itself. Mencius used one word â€Å"thinking† to sum up the function of the heart. He said, â€Å"The organ of the heart can think. But it will find the answer only if it does think: otherwise, it will not find the answer. This is what Heaven has given me† (M, VI, A, 15). By thus explaining the source of the heart, especially its function of commanding, he bridges the gap between Heaven and man. Therefore, instead of stating that Mencius substitutes â€Å"self-legislation† for â€Å"external divine command,† we prefer to say that man’s self-legislation is bestowed on him by Heaven.10 The relation between Heaven and man is another interesting topic in Mencius’ thought, but is beyond the scope of the present essay. What we have established thus far is that the reason why human nature tends toward goodness consists in its relation with Heaven. Better known in China as â€Å"Master Meng† (Chinese: Mengzi), Mencius was a fourth-century BCE Chinese thinker whose importance in the Confucian tradition is second only to that of Confucius himself. In many ways, he played the role of St. Paul to Confucius’ Jesus, interpreting the thought of the master for subsequent ages while simultaneously impressing Confucius’ ideas with his own philosophical stamp. He is most famous for his theory of human nature, according to which all human beings share an innate goodness that either can be cultivated through education and self-discipline or squandered through neglect and negative influences, but never lost altogether. While it is not clear that Mencius’ views prevailed in early Chinese philosophical circles, they eventually won out after gaining the support of influential medieval commentators and thinkers such as Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi, 1130-1200 CE) and Wang Yangming The Mencius of History Like the historical Confucius, the historical Mencius is a vailable only through a text that, in its complete form at least, postdates his traditional lifetime (372-289 BCE). The philological controversy surrounding the date and composition of the text that bears his name is far less intense than that which surrounds the Confucian Analects, however. Most scholars agree that the entire Mencius was assembled by Mencius himself and his immediate disciples, perhaps shortly after his death. The text records several encounters with various rulers during Mencius’ old age, which can be dated between 323 and 314 BCE, making Mencius an active figure no later than the late fourth century BCE. The other major source of information about Mencius’ life is the biography found in the Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian) of Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE), which states that he was a native of Zou (Tsou), a small state near Confucius’ home state of Lu in the Shandong peninsula of nort heastern China. He is said to have studied with Confucius’ grandson, Zisi (Tzu-ssu), although most modern scholars doubt this. He also is thought to have become a minister of the state of Qi (Ch’i), which also was famous as the home of the Jixia (Chi-hsia) Academy. The Jixia Academy was a kind of early Chinese â€Å"think tank† sponsored the ruler of Qi that produced, among other thinkers, Mencius’ later opponent Xunzi (Hsun-tzu, 310-220 BCE). Mencius inherits from Confucius a set of terms and a series of problems. In general, one can say that where Confucius saw a unity of inner and outer – in terms of li (ritual propriety), ren (co-humanity), and the junzi (profound person)-xiaoren (small person) distinction – Mencius tends to privilege the inner aspects of concepts, practices, and identities. For Mencius, the locus of philosophical activity and self-cultivation is the xin (hsin), a term that denotes both the chief organ of the circulatory system and the organ of thought, and hence is translated here and in many other sources as â€Å"heart-mind.† Mencius’ views of the divine, political organization, human nature, and the path toward personal development all start and end in the heart-mind. . Theodicy Again, as with Confucius, so too with Mencius. From late Zhou tradition, Mencius inherited a great many religious sensibilities, including theistic ones. For the early Chinese (c. 16th century BCE), the world was controlled by an all-powerful deity, â€Å"The Lord on High† (Shangdi), to whom entreaties were made in the first known Chinese texts, inscriptions found on animal bones offered in divinatory sacrifice. As the Zhou polity emerged and triumphed over the previous Shang tribal rule, Zhou apologists began to regard their deity, Tian (â€Å"Sky† or â€Å"Heaven†) as synonymous with Shangdi, the deity of the deposed Shang kings, and explained the decline of Shang and the rise of Zhou as a consequence of a change in Tianming (â€Å"the mandate of Heaven†). Thus, theistic justifications for conquest and rulership were present very early in Chinese history. By the time of Mencius, the concept of Tian appears to have changed slightly, taking on aspects of à ¢â‚¬Å"fate† and â€Å"nature† as well as â€Å"deity.† For Confucius, Tian provided personal support and sanction for his sense of historical mission, while at the same time prompting Job-like anxiety during moments of ill fortune in which Tian seemed to have abandoned him. Mencius’ faith in Tian as the ultimate source of legitimate moral and political authority is unshakeable. Like Confucius, he says that â€Å"Tian does not speak – it simply reveals through deeds and affairs† (5A5). He ascribes the virtues of ren (co-humanity), yi (rightness), li (ritual propriety), zhi (wisdom), and sheng (sagehood) to Tian (7B24) and explicitly compares the rule of the moral king to the rule of Tian (5A4). The dependence of Tian upon human agents to put its will into practice helps account for the emphasis Mencius places on the satisfaction of the people as an indicator of the ruler’s moral right to power, and on the responsibility of morally-minded ministers to depose an unworthy ruler. In a dialogue with King Xuan of Qi (r. 319-301 BCE), Mencius says: The people are to be valued most, the altars of the grain and the land [traditional symbols of the vitality of the state] next, the ruler least. Hence winning the favor of the common people you become Emperor†¦. (7B14) When the ruler makes a serious mistake they admonish. If after repeated admonishments he still will not listen, they depose him†¦. Do not think it strange, Your Majesty. Your Majesty asked his servant a question, and his servant dares not fail to answer it directly. (5B9) Mencius’ replies to King Xuan are bracingly direct, in fact, but he can be coy. When the king asks whether it is true that various sage kings (Tang and Wu) rebelled against and murdered their predecessors (Jie and Zhou), Mencius answers that it is true. The king then asks: â€Å"Is it permissible for a vassal to murder his lord?† Mencius replied, â€Å"One who robs co-humanity [ren] you call a `robber’; one who robs the right [yi] you call a `wrecker’; and one who robs and wrecks you call an `outlaw.’ I have heard that [Wu] punished the outlaw Zhou – I have not heard that he murdered his lord. (1B8) In other words, Wu was morally justified in executing Zhou, because Zhou had proven himself to be unworthy of the throne through his offenses against ren and yi – the very qualities associated with the Confucian exemplar (junzi) and his actions. This is an example of Mencius engaging in the â€Å"rectification of names† (zhengming), an exercise that Confucius considered to be prior to all other philosophical activity (Analects 13.3). While Mencius endorses a â€Å"right of revolution,† he is no democrat. His ideal ruler is the sage-king, such as the legendary Shun, on whose reign both divine sanction and popular approval conferred legitimacy: When he was put in charge of sacrifices, the hundred gods delighted in them which is Heaven accepting him. When he was put in charge of affairs, the affairs were in order and the people satisfied with him, which is the people accepting him. Heaven gave it [the state] to him; human beings gave it to him. (5A5) Mencius is famous for claiming that human nature (renxing) is good. As with most reductions of philosophical positions to bumper-sticker slogans, this statement oversimplifies Mencius’ position. In the text, Mencius takes a more careful route in order to arrive at this view. Following A. C. Graham, one can see his argument as having three elements: (1) a teleology, (2) a virtue theory, and (3) a moral psychology. Confucius Better known in China as â€Å"Master Kong† (Chinese: Kongzi), Confucius was a fifth-century BCE Chinese thinker whose influence upon East Asian intellectual and social history is immeasurable. As a culturally symbolic figure, he has been alternately idealized, deified, dismissed, vilified, and rehabilitated over the millennia by both Asian and non-Asian thinkers and regimes. Given his extraordinary impact on Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese thought, it is ironic that so little can be known about Confucius. The tradition that bears his name – â€Å"Confucianism† (Chinese: Rujia) – ultimately traces itself to the sayings and biographical fragments recorded in the text known as the Analects (Chinese: Lunyu). As with the person of Confucius himself, scholars disagree about the origins and character of the Analects, but it remains the traditional source for information about Confucius’ life and teaching. Most scholars remain confident that it is possible to extract from the Analects several philosophical themes and views that may be safely attributed to this ancient Chinese sage. These are primarily ethical, rather than analytical-logical or metaphysical in nature, and include Confucius’ claim that Tian (â€Å"Heaven†) is aligned with moral order but dependent upon human agents to actualize its will; his concern for li (ritual propriety) as the instrument through which the family, the state, and the world may be aligned with Tian’s moral order; and his belief in the â€Å"contagious† nature of moral force (de), by which moral rulers diffuse morality to their subjects, moral parents raise moral children, and so forth. The Confucius of the Analects Above all else, the Analects depicts Confucius as someone who â€Å"transmits, but does not innovate† (7.1). What Confucius claimed to transmit was the Dao (Way) of the sages of Zhou antiquity; in the Analects, he is the erudite guardian of tradition who challenges his disciples to emulate the sages of the past and restore the moral integrity of the state. Although readers of the Analects often assume that Confucius’ views are presented as a coherent and consistent system within the text, a careful reading reveals several different sets of philosophical concerns which do not conflict so much as they complement one another. Those familiar with Enlightenment-influenced presentations of Confucius as an austere humanist who did not discuss the supernatural may be surprised to encounter the term â€Å"theodicy† as a framework for understanding Confucius’ philosophical concerns. Confucius’ record of silence on the subject of the divine is attested by the Analects (5.3, 7.21, 11.12). In fact, as a child of the late Zhou world, Confucius inherited a great many religious sensibilities, including theistic ones. For the early Chinese (c. 16th century BCE), the world was controlled by an all-powerful deity, â€Å"The Lord on High† (Shangdi), to whom entreaties were made in the first known Chinese texts, inscriptions found on animal bones offered in divinatory sacrifice. As the Zhou polity emerged and triumphed over the previous Shang tribal rule, Zhou apologists began to regard their deity, Tian (â€Å"Sky† or â€Å"Heaven†) as synonymous with Shangdi, the deity of the deposed Shang kings, and explained the decline of Shang and the rise of Zhou as a consequence of a change in Tianming (â€Å"the mandate of Heaven†). Thus, theistic justifications for conquest and rulership were present very early in Chinese history.By the time of Confucius, the concept of Tian appears to have changed slightly. For one thing, the ritual complex of Zhou diviners, which served to ascertain the will of Tian for the benefit of the king, had collapsed with Zhou rule itself. At the same time, the network of religious obligations to manifold divinities, local spirits, and ancestors does not seem to have ceased with the fall of the Zhou, and Confucius appears to uphold sacrifices to â€Å"gods and ghosts† as consistent with â€Å"transmitting† noble tradition. Yet, in the Analects, a new aspect of Tian emerges. For the Confucius of the Analects, discerning the will of Tian and reconciling it with his own moral compass sometimes proves to be a troubling exercise: If Heaven is about to abandon this culture, those who die afterwards will not get to share in it; if Heaven has not yet abandoned this culture, what can the men of Guang [Confucius’ adversaries in this instance] do to me? (9.5) There is no one who recognizes me†¦. I neither resent Heaven nor blame humanity. In learning about the lower I have understood the higher. The one who recognizes me – wouldn’t that be Heaven? (14.35) Heaven has abandoned me! Heaven has abandoned me! (11.9) As we all know that Mencius several times throughout Chinese history has been regarded as a potentially â€Å"dangerous† author, leading at times to outright banning of his book. This is because Mencius developed a very early form of what was to be called in modern times the â€Å"social contract.† Mencius, like Confucius, believed that rulers were divinely placed in order to guarantee peace and order among the people they rule. Unlike Confucius, Mencius believed that if a ruler failed to bring peace and order about, then the people could be absolved of all loyalty to that ruler and could if they felt strongly enough about the matter, revolt. I surmise if we go into details, it will probably take us months or maybe even years before finishing this comparison. I personally felt that Mencius and Confucius did not share nearly the same feelings for what was the most important unit in a society. I believe Confucius set up the belief of â€Å"Emperor, Master, and Father.â⠂¬  Basically, all subjects were obliged to the orders of the Emperor. All students were required to follow the footsteps of their Masters. In the same way that all children should obey their fathers commands. If at any given time these orders came in conflicts with one another, then everyone must choose to put the Emperor’s demands above everything else. Perhaps, this concept was one of the main reasons why Confucianism was promoted as the state’s ideology during the reign of Han Wudi. On the other hand, Mencius had a totally different view. Mencius insisted that â€Å"People came first Empires/Nations were only second, while the Emperor was the least important.† Well I am sure that not too many people would be happy to hear this argument let alone agree. This concept will definitely tolerate rebellions against a tyrannical ruler. The Emperor was working in the best interests of the people. Without the people’s support, the emperor had certainly failed his du ties as the leader. While Confucius’s theory I think that Confucius was more correct in his views than Mencius, not because of differing views (although they did differ at certain points), but because of the way these ideas were carried out throughout his career, and ultimately, his life. Confucius was a Chinese thinker and philosopher. His philosophy emphasized personal and governmental morality, correctness of social relationships, and justice and sincerity. These values gained prominence in China over other doctrines, such as Taoism during the Han Dynasty. Confucius’ thoughts have been developed into a system of philosophy which has come to be known as Confucianism. It was introduced to Europe by Matteo Ricci, who was the first to come up with the Latin name â€Å"Confucius†. His teachings may be found in the Analects of Confucius, a collection of â€Å"brief aphoristic fragments†, which was compiled many years after his death. For nearly 2,000 years he was thought to be the editor or author of all the Five Classics, such as the Classic of Rites and the Spring and Autumn Annals, but this was not the case as many of these â€Å"fragments† cannot be directly credited to Confucius because of lack of written proof. Confucius was born in 551 BC in the Lu state of China, born into a warrior family. His father, Shulianghe, was a famous warrior who fought in the chinese military, and owned a large portion of land. Confucius lost his father when he was three years old, and then his mother Yan Zhengzai took him and left his father’s land because, as a concubine, she wanted to avoid the scorn from Shulianghe’s real wife. Therefore, Confucius lived in poverty with his mother since childhood. With the support and encouragement of his mother, Confucius studied hard as a child. When Confucius was seventeen, his mother died as a result of illness and exhaustion. Three years later, Confucius married. Though he had a good wife who loved him, he left his family to pursue his philosophical goals. Confucius sought to revive the As we all know that Mencius several times throughout Chinese history has been regarded as a potentially â€Å"dangerous† author, leading at times to outright banning of his book. This is because Mencius developed a very early form of what was to be called in modern times the â€Å"social contract.† Mencius, like Confucius, believed that rulers were divinely placed in order to guarantee peace and order among the people they rule. Unlike Confucius, Mencius believed that if a ruler failed to bring peace and order about, then the people could be absolved of all loyalty to that ruler and could if they felt strongly enough about the matter, revolt. I surmise if we go into details, it will probably take us months or maybe even years before finishing this comparison. I personally felt that Mencius and Confucius did not share nearly the same feelings for what was the most important unit in a society. I believe Confucius set up the belief of â€Å"Emperor, Master, and Father.† Basically, all subjects were obliged to the orders of the Emperor. All students were required to follow the footsteps of their Masters. In the same way that all children should obey their fathers commands. If at any given time these orders came in conflicts with one another, then everyone must choose to put the Emperor’s demands above everything else. Perhaps, this concept was one of the main reasons why Confucianism was promoted as the state’s ideology during the reign of Han Wudi. On the other hand, Mencius had a totally different view. Mencius insisted that â€Å"People came first Empires/Nations were only second, while the Emperor was the least important.† Well I am sure that not too many people would be happy to hear this argument let alone agree. This concept will definitely tolerate rebellions against a tyrannical ruler. The Emperor was working in the best interests of the people. Without the people’s support, the emperor had certainly failed his duties as the leader.