Case Attrition Essay Example for Free

Case Attrition Essay Case attrition is the failure of arrests to come to trial; less than half of all felony arrests result in conviction (Meyer, J Grant, D. 2003). Basically, case attrition is when an arrest does not end in a trial conviction, which happens quite often in the court justice system. The effect case attrition has on the criminal justice system effects all levels of the criminal justice process, because an arrest or no arrest affects all aspects of the criminal justice process. Law enforcement officers can develop negative feelings about the justice system and feel that their work is not getting noticed. The high levels of case attrition in modern systems shows that the criminal law has very substantial limitations as a direct crime control such as, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Criminal convictions and penalties deserved punishment and reinforce important societal denunciation, but if these penal consequences are imposed according to procedure that are widely perceived as fair and just. Attrition can get rid of individuals in the over-worked justice system that were arrested that either had a problem with the legality of the arrest or it was the result of an overworked, or bad officer in a situation where an arrest was not necessary (Meyer, J Grant, D. 2003). When these cases are removed from the justice system, it is possible for attorneys and judges to be able to focus on more serious crimes. Reference Meyer, J Grant, D. (2003) The Courts in Our Criminal Justice System

Attitudes of War in Ancient Civilizations Essay -- essays research pap

Chapter Eight War and Society reveals the attitudes about war in both ancient Rome and China. These attitudes prove that in these cases perhaps it is safe to say that wars are not inevitable or natural but were caused by warlike societies and social situations. After reading bits and pieces of both the ancient Roman and Chinese history, one can only gain a greater perspective on how these attitudes derived. In 391 nomads called the Gauls defeated a small army of Roman aristocrats and burnt down the town of Rome. After this attack, Rome rebuilt its town and changed it into an empire, which spread its laws, culture, and peace from the North. Rome was convinced that after this first invasion, it was necessary to change their military. Over time the Romans were able to conquer most of Italy. As the Romans began to gain power and land, they set their eyes on larger obstacles. This is when Roman attitude was perhaps revealed about the subject of war. Romans believed that their expansion had been inevitable so they were to believe that they were blameless, and that their ancestors had been more than a passive tool of destiny. They believed that other areas, posed as possible threats and that it was necessary â€Å"for defensive reasons† to attack first. Today, these can be viewed as possibly preventive wars. But during the time of the expansion of the Roman Empire, a preventive war wasn’t a concern. Other views were demonstrated in their actions, that although at first Romans were unable to take Carthage, they kept trying, and over time, and most likely many deaths, the Roman soldiers wore them down. Rome was like a bulldozer and used their skilled military to their advantage, to take over and destroy anything that it set its eyes on. Their actions, such as later completely destroying Carthage and massacring the majority of its population all because it posed as a potential economic threat to Roman land. These views or attitudes of war can be easily seen, war was not considered a preventive war, but a necessary war, although many times, it was clearly unnecessary and the fall of the Roman Empire, eventually gave the Roman commanders what they deserved. On the flipside, ancient Chinese attitude toward war was quite similar to that of the Romans. Warfare in this society was common and accepted, the idea of honor also coincides with their attitude toward war. â€Å"When ... ...e end. I believe that this closely relates to the early context of â€Å"Is the Glory of War a Boy Thing?† Because I believe one can easily glorify both the rise of the empires as a courageous and powerful movement, rather then closely looking at the true outcome of these wars. A Pericles type of funeral oration would have possibly been effective in ancient Rome or China, because at the time both were such powerful empires, people would have easily been convinced to believe practically anything. How can one find it just, to kill practically a whole society because they pose as a possible threat to economy because they too, are growing grapes? Pericles states in his oration that the people under his society are the best, and that it was perfectly acceptable to dominate other areas. He also mentions ancestors, and the pride in Athens, so its important to praise and glorify those who died. Isn’t it funny how history repeats itself? The Romans believed that because felt threatened it was okay to dominate other lands, and their ancestors faced hardships with the nomads it was acceptable to do so in return. Or the Chinese, who believed that war a proper, powerful, and masculine act of man.

Differentiate Mencius and Confucius Class in Human Nature Essay

Confucius’ view on human nature was not clearly and distinctly supplied in the Analects. It is no surprise that one of his disciples complained that â€Å"one cannot get to hear his view on human nature† (A, 5:13).1 In two passages of the Analects, Confucius classified men as belonging to three groups: â€Å"upper, middle and lower,† but as this classification was made according to man’s â€Å"learning ability† it had nothing to do with the common nature of man.2 Another two passages expressed more directly Confucius’ opinion in this respect. THE THEORY OF CONFUCIUS ON HUMAN NATURE Confucius’ view on human nature was not clearly and distinctly supplied in the Analects. It is no surprise that one of his disciples complained that â€Å"one cannot get to hear his view on human nature† (A, 5:13).1 In two passages of the Analects, Confucius classified men as belonging to three groups: â€Å"upper, middle and lower,† but as this classification was made according to man’s â€Å"learning ability† it had nothing to do with the common nature of man.2 Another two passages expressed more directly Confucius’ opinion in this respect. On the basis of Confucius’ teachings, Mencius and Hsà ¼n-tzu developed philosophies which sometimes were considered mutually complementary. As regards the theory of human nature, however, Mencius and Hsà ¼n-tzu obviously held incompatible views. The following discussion will try to show that Mencius’ theory of â€Å"human nature as good† is in fact a theory of â€Å"human heart as good,† and Hsà ¼n-tzu’s theory of â€Å"human nature as evil† is actually a theory of â€Å"human desire as evil.† These two theories are not necessarily contradictory, since they share the same underlying idea that human nature tends toward goodness. To clarify this point, we will lay more stress on the works of Mencius and the Chung-yung which directly elaborated on this idea than on those of Hsà ¼n-tzu and the I-chuan which accepted this idea in an implicit way. Mencius Etymologically, human â€Å"nature† (hsing) comes from â€Å"birth† or â€Å"to be born with† (sheng). The common understanding of this word in ancient China can be formulated as follows: â€Å"The inborn is what is meant by nature† (M, VI, A, 3).5 However, this consideration of the origin of nature exhibits only what a thing has rather than what a thing is: it expresses at most the sameness rather than the difference of all things. In order to determine what a thing is, it is necessary to know its essence: the genus plus the difference of species. This rule, made familiar by Aristotle, was true also for Mencius. First, Mencius was quite aware that in dealing with anything of the same kind, we must determine what this â€Å"same kind† means, and this is even more true when applied to man. Mencius said, â€Å"Now, things of the same kind are all alike. Why should we have doubts when it comes to man? The sage and I are of the same kind† (M, VI, A, 7). The wicked, however, also belong to the same kind. Thus, in determining the essence of human beings, we should find the difference of species. Mencius said, Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it. Shun understood the way of things and had a keen insight into human relations. He followed the path of benevolence and righteousness. He did not need to pursue benevolence and righteousness (M, IV, B,19). Clearly, the essence or the distinguishing feature of man must be understood through the â€Å"slight difference† between man and the brutes. The statement about Shun is an example that benevolence and righteousness are the interior path of man, following which will have a great effect. The implication of this whole sentence is probably that benevolence and righteousness belong to the â€Å"slight difference.†6 Another paragraph will also help clarify the distinguishing feature of man. â€Å"A gentleman differs from other men in what he retains in his heart–namely, benevolence and propriety† (M, IV, B, 28). Granted that the human essence of man can be described as benevolenc e, righteousness, propriety, etc., how can common people lose it? Can something be defined by a feature which can be lost? The key to the answer lies in the idea of â€Å"heart,† which is to be understood here as neither bodily heart, nor soul, but mind with sensitivity. Concerning human nature, Mencius presents his famous theory of â€Å"the four germs of the heart,† concluding as follows: From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human (M, II, A, 6). These four states of heart are named, in turn, the germs of â€Å"benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom† (M, II, A, 6) within man’s heart, which forms the difference of human beings. Human nature must be defined through this heart: Mencius said, â€Å"That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, is rooted in his heart† (M, VII, A, 21). Therefore the goodness of human nature resides in the goodness of the heart. A reservation, however, must be added, namely, that goodnes s exists only in the state of germ and needs to be retained, nourished, and developed. In this way Mencius demonstrated that human nature is tending toward goodness. He did not stop at this point, but continued to examine the nature and origin of the heart. Mencius affirmed that there is a propensity for development within the heart which makes it an â€Å"evaluating heart.† If this means an ability to be moral and human beings are moral agents,8 does not its propensity for development imply in some sense a â€Å"commanding heart†?9 It must be the case, then, that the evaluating heart is at the same time the commanding heart, for otherwise how could Mencius honor as gentleman those who â€Å"retain† it? Only with this understanding does it become meaningful to say that â€Å"there is nothing better for the nurturing of the heart than to reduce the number of one’s desires† (M, VII, B, 35). Only if the heart does more than evaluate can Mencius say, â€Å"The sole concern of learning is to go after this strayed heart. That is all† (M, VI, A, 11). On the basis of this double character of the heart, we can loo k further at the heart in itself. Mencius used one word â€Å"thinking† to sum up the function of the heart. He said, â€Å"The organ of the heart can think. But it will find the answer only if it does think: otherwise, it will not find the answer. This is what Heaven has given me† (M, VI, A, 15). By thus explaining the source of the heart, especially its function of commanding, he bridges the gap between Heaven and man. Therefore, instead of stating that Mencius substitutes â€Å"self-legislation† for â€Å"external divine command,† we prefer to say that man’s self-legislation is bestowed on him by Heaven.10 The relation between Heaven and man is another interesting topic in Mencius’ thought, but is beyond the scope of the present essay. What we have established thus far is that the reason why human nature tends toward goodness consists in its relation with Heaven. Better known in China as â€Å"Master Meng† (Chinese: Mengzi), Mencius was a fourth-century BCE Chinese thinker whose importance in the Confucian tradition is second only to that of Confucius himself. In many ways, he played the role of St. Paul to Confucius’ Jesus, interpreting the thought of the master for subsequent ages while simultaneously impressing Confucius’ ideas with his own philosophical stamp. He is most famous for his theory of human nature, according to which all human beings share an innate goodness that either can be cultivated through education and self-discipline or squandered through neglect and negative influences, but never lost altogether. While it is not clear that Mencius’ views prevailed in early Chinese philosophical circles, they eventually won out after gaining the support of influential medieval commentators and thinkers such as Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi, 1130-1200 CE) and Wang Yangming The Mencius of History Like the historical Confucius, the historical Mencius is a vailable only through a text that, in its complete form at least, postdates his traditional lifetime (372-289 BCE). The philological controversy surrounding the date and composition of the text that bears his name is far less intense than that which surrounds the Confucian Analects, however. Most scholars agree that the entire Mencius was assembled by Mencius himself and his immediate disciples, perhaps shortly after his death. The text records several encounters with various rulers during Mencius’ old age, which can be dated between 323 and 314 BCE, making Mencius an active figure no later than the late fourth century BCE. The other major source of information about Mencius’ life is the biography found in the Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian) of Sima Qian (c. 145-90 BCE), which states that he was a native of Zou (Tsou), a small state near Confucius’ home state of Lu in the Shandong peninsula of nort heastern China. He is said to have studied with Confucius’ grandson, Zisi (Tzu-ssu), although most modern scholars doubt this. He also is thought to have become a minister of the state of Qi (Ch’i), which also was famous as the home of the Jixia (Chi-hsia) Academy. The Jixia Academy was a kind of early Chinese â€Å"think tank† sponsored the ruler of Qi that produced, among other thinkers, Mencius’ later opponent Xunzi (Hsun-tzu, 310-220 BCE). Mencius inherits from Confucius a set of terms and a series of problems. In general, one can say that where Confucius saw a unity of inner and outer – in terms of li (ritual propriety), ren (co-humanity), and the junzi (profound person)-xiaoren (small person) distinction – Mencius tends to privilege the inner aspects of concepts, practices, and identities. For Mencius, the locus of philosophical activity and self-cultivation is the xin (hsin), a term that denotes both the chief organ of the circulatory system and the organ of thought, and hence is translated here and in many other sources as â€Å"heart-mind.† Mencius’ views of the divine, political organization, human nature, and the path toward personal development all start and end in the heart-mind. . Theodicy Again, as with Confucius, so too with Mencius. From late Zhou tradition, Mencius inherited a great many religious sensibilities, including theistic ones. For the early Chinese (c. 16th century BCE), the world was controlled by an all-powerful deity, â€Å"The Lord on High† (Shangdi), to whom entreaties were made in the first known Chinese texts, inscriptions found on animal bones offered in divinatory sacrifice. As the Zhou polity emerged and triumphed over the previous Shang tribal rule, Zhou apologists began to regard their deity, Tian (â€Å"Sky† or â€Å"Heaven†) as synonymous with Shangdi, the deity of the deposed Shang kings, and explained the decline of Shang and the rise of Zhou as a consequence of a change in Tianming (â€Å"the mandate of Heaven†). Thus, theistic justifications for conquest and rulership were present very early in Chinese history. By the time of Mencius, the concept of Tian appears to have changed slightly, taking on aspects of à ¢â‚¬Å"fate† and â€Å"nature† as well as â€Å"deity.† For Confucius, Tian provided personal support and sanction for his sense of historical mission, while at the same time prompting Job-like anxiety during moments of ill fortune in which Tian seemed to have abandoned him. Mencius’ faith in Tian as the ultimate source of legitimate moral and political authority is unshakeable. Like Confucius, he says that â€Å"Tian does not speak – it simply reveals through deeds and affairs† (5A5). He ascribes the virtues of ren (co-humanity), yi (rightness), li (ritual propriety), zhi (wisdom), and sheng (sagehood) to Tian (7B24) and explicitly compares the rule of the moral king to the rule of Tian (5A4). The dependence of Tian upon human agents to put its will into practice helps account for the emphasis Mencius places on the satisfaction of the people as an indicator of the ruler’s moral right to power, and on the responsibility of morally-minded ministers to depose an unworthy ruler. In a dialogue with King Xuan of Qi (r. 319-301 BCE), Mencius says: The people are to be valued most, the altars of the grain and the land [traditional symbols of the vitality of the state] next, the ruler least. Hence winning the favor of the common people you become Emperor†¦. (7B14) When the ruler makes a serious mistake they admonish. If after repeated admonishments he still will not listen, they depose him†¦. Do not think it strange, Your Majesty. Your Majesty asked his servant a question, and his servant dares not fail to answer it directly. (5B9) Mencius’ replies to King Xuan are bracingly direct, in fact, but he can be coy. When the king asks whether it is true that various sage kings (Tang and Wu) rebelled against and murdered their predecessors (Jie and Zhou), Mencius answers that it is true. The king then asks: â€Å"Is it permissible for a vassal to murder his lord?† Mencius replied, â€Å"One who robs co-humanity [ren] you call a `robber’; one who robs the right [yi] you call a `wrecker’; and one who robs and wrecks you call an `outlaw.’ I have heard that [Wu] punished the outlaw Zhou – I have not heard that he murdered his lord. (1B8) In other words, Wu was morally justified in executing Zhou, because Zhou had proven himself to be unworthy of the throne through his offenses against ren and yi – the very qualities associated with the Confucian exemplar (junzi) and his actions. This is an example of Mencius engaging in the â€Å"rectification of names† (zhengming), an exercise that Confucius considered to be prior to all other philosophical activity (Analects 13.3). While Mencius endorses a â€Å"right of revolution,† he is no democrat. His ideal ruler is the sage-king, such as the legendary Shun, on whose reign both divine sanction and popular approval conferred legitimacy: When he was put in charge of sacrifices, the hundred gods delighted in them which is Heaven accepting him. When he was put in charge of affairs, the affairs were in order and the people satisfied with him, which is the people accepting him. Heaven gave it [the state] to him; human beings gave it to him. (5A5) Mencius is famous for claiming that human nature (renxing) is good. As with most reductions of philosophical positions to bumper-sticker slogans, this statement oversimplifies Mencius’ position. In the text, Mencius takes a more careful route in order to arrive at this view. Following A. C. Graham, one can see his argument as having three elements: (1) a teleology, (2) a virtue theory, and (3) a moral psychology. Confucius Better known in China as â€Å"Master Kong† (Chinese: Kongzi), Confucius was a fifth-century BCE Chinese thinker whose influence upon East Asian intellectual and social history is immeasurable. As a culturally symbolic figure, he has been alternately idealized, deified, dismissed, vilified, and rehabilitated over the millennia by both Asian and non-Asian thinkers and regimes. Given his extraordinary impact on Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese thought, it is ironic that so little can be known about Confucius. The tradition that bears his name – â€Å"Confucianism† (Chinese: Rujia) – ultimately traces itself to the sayings and biographical fragments recorded in the text known as the Analects (Chinese: Lunyu). As with the person of Confucius himself, scholars disagree about the origins and character of the Analects, but it remains the traditional source for information about Confucius’ life and teaching. Most scholars remain confident that it is possible to extract from the Analects several philosophical themes and views that may be safely attributed to this ancient Chinese sage. These are primarily ethical, rather than analytical-logical or metaphysical in nature, and include Confucius’ claim that Tian (â€Å"Heaven†) is aligned with moral order but dependent upon human agents to actualize its will; his concern for li (ritual propriety) as the instrument through which the family, the state, and the world may be aligned with Tian’s moral order; and his belief in the â€Å"contagious† nature of moral force (de), by which moral rulers diffuse morality to their subjects, moral parents raise moral children, and so forth. The Confucius of the Analects Above all else, the Analects depicts Confucius as someone who â€Å"transmits, but does not innovate† (7.1). What Confucius claimed to transmit was the Dao (Way) of the sages of Zhou antiquity; in the Analects, he is the erudite guardian of tradition who challenges his disciples to emulate the sages of the past and restore the moral integrity of the state. Although readers of the Analects often assume that Confucius’ views are presented as a coherent and consistent system within the text, a careful reading reveals several different sets of philosophical concerns which do not conflict so much as they complement one another. Those familiar with Enlightenment-influenced presentations of Confucius as an austere humanist who did not discuss the supernatural may be surprised to encounter the term â€Å"theodicy† as a framework for understanding Confucius’ philosophical concerns. Confucius’ record of silence on the subject of the divine is attested by the Analects (5.3, 7.21, 11.12). In fact, as a child of the late Zhou world, Confucius inherited a great many religious sensibilities, including theistic ones. For the early Chinese (c. 16th century BCE), the world was controlled by an all-powerful deity, â€Å"The Lord on High† (Shangdi), to whom entreaties were made in the first known Chinese texts, inscriptions found on animal bones offered in divinatory sacrifice. As the Zhou polity emerged and triumphed over the previous Shang tribal rule, Zhou apologists began to regard their deity, Tian (â€Å"Sky† or â€Å"Heaven†) as synonymous with Shangdi, the deity of the deposed Shang kings, and explained the decline of Shang and the rise of Zhou as a consequence of a change in Tianming (â€Å"the mandate of Heaven†). Thus, theistic justifications for conquest and rulership were present very early in Chinese history.By the time of Confucius, the concept of Tian appears to have changed slightly. For one thing, the ritual complex of Zhou diviners, which served to ascertain the will of Tian for the benefit of the king, had collapsed with Zhou rule itself. At the same time, the network of religious obligations to manifold divinities, local spirits, and ancestors does not seem to have ceased with the fall of the Zhou, and Confucius appears to uphold sacrifices to â€Å"gods and ghosts† as consistent with â€Å"transmitting† noble tradition. Yet, in the Analects, a new aspect of Tian emerges. For the Confucius of the Analects, discerning the will of Tian and reconciling it with his own moral compass sometimes proves to be a troubling exercise: If Heaven is about to abandon this culture, those who die afterwards will not get to share in it; if Heaven has not yet abandoned this culture, what can the men of Guang [Confucius’ adversaries in this instance] do to me? (9.5) There is no one who recognizes me†¦. I neither resent Heaven nor blame humanity. In learning about the lower I have understood the higher. The one who recognizes me – wouldn’t that be Heaven? (14.35) Heaven has abandoned me! Heaven has abandoned me! (11.9) As we all know that Mencius several times throughout Chinese history has been regarded as a potentially â€Å"dangerous† author, leading at times to outright banning of his book. This is because Mencius developed a very early form of what was to be called in modern times the â€Å"social contract.† Mencius, like Confucius, believed that rulers were divinely placed in order to guarantee peace and order among the people they rule. Unlike Confucius, Mencius believed that if a ruler failed to bring peace and order about, then the people could be absolved of all loyalty to that ruler and could if they felt strongly enough about the matter, revolt. I surmise if we go into details, it will probably take us months or maybe even years before finishing this comparison. I personally felt that Mencius and Confucius did not share nearly the same feelings for what was the most important unit in a society. I believe Confucius set up the belief of â€Å"Emperor, Master, and Father.â⠂¬  Basically, all subjects were obliged to the orders of the Emperor. All students were required to follow the footsteps of their Masters. In the same way that all children should obey their fathers commands. If at any given time these orders came in conflicts with one another, then everyone must choose to put the Emperor’s demands above everything else. Perhaps, this concept was one of the main reasons why Confucianism was promoted as the state’s ideology during the reign of Han Wudi. On the other hand, Mencius had a totally different view. Mencius insisted that â€Å"People came first Empires/Nations were only second, while the Emperor was the least important.† Well I am sure that not too many people would be happy to hear this argument let alone agree. This concept will definitely tolerate rebellions against a tyrannical ruler. The Emperor was working in the best interests of the people. Without the people’s support, the emperor had certainly failed his du ties as the leader. While Confucius’s theory I think that Confucius was more correct in his views than Mencius, not because of differing views (although they did differ at certain points), but because of the way these ideas were carried out throughout his career, and ultimately, his life. Confucius was a Chinese thinker and philosopher. His philosophy emphasized personal and governmental morality, correctness of social relationships, and justice and sincerity. These values gained prominence in China over other doctrines, such as Taoism during the Han Dynasty. Confucius’ thoughts have been developed into a system of philosophy which has come to be known as Confucianism. It was introduced to Europe by Matteo Ricci, who was the first to come up with the Latin name â€Å"Confucius†. His teachings may be found in the Analects of Confucius, a collection of â€Å"brief aphoristic fragments†, which was compiled many years after his death. For nearly 2,000 years he was thought to be the editor or author of all the Five Classics, such as the Classic of Rites and the Spring and Autumn Annals, but this was not the case as many of these â€Å"fragments† cannot be directly credited to Confucius because of lack of written proof. Confucius was born in 551 BC in the Lu state of China, born into a warrior family. His father, Shulianghe, was a famous warrior who fought in the chinese military, and owned a large portion of land. Confucius lost his father when he was three years old, and then his mother Yan Zhengzai took him and left his father’s land because, as a concubine, she wanted to avoid the scorn from Shulianghe’s real wife. Therefore, Confucius lived in poverty with his mother since childhood. With the support and encouragement of his mother, Confucius studied hard as a child. When Confucius was seventeen, his mother died as a result of illness and exhaustion. Three years later, Confucius married. Though he had a good wife who loved him, he left his family to pursue his philosophical goals. Confucius sought to revive the As we all know that Mencius several times throughout Chinese history has been regarded as a potentially â€Å"dangerous† author, leading at times to outright banning of his book. This is because Mencius developed a very early form of what was to be called in modern times the â€Å"social contract.† Mencius, like Confucius, believed that rulers were divinely placed in order to guarantee peace and order among the people they rule. Unlike Confucius, Mencius believed that if a ruler failed to bring peace and order about, then the people could be absolved of all loyalty to that ruler and could if they felt strongly enough about the matter, revolt. I surmise if we go into details, it will probably take us months or maybe even years before finishing this comparison. I personally felt that Mencius and Confucius did not share nearly the same feelings for what was the most important unit in a society. I believe Confucius set up the belief of â€Å"Emperor, Master, and Father.† Basically, all subjects were obliged to the orders of the Emperor. All students were required to follow the footsteps of their Masters. In the same way that all children should obey their fathers commands. If at any given time these orders came in conflicts with one another, then everyone must choose to put the Emperor’s demands above everything else. Perhaps, this concept was one of the main reasons why Confucianism was promoted as the state’s ideology during the reign of Han Wudi. On the other hand, Mencius had a totally different view. Mencius insisted that â€Å"People came first Empires/Nations were only second, while the Emperor was the least important.† Well I am sure that not too many people would be happy to hear this argument let alone agree. This concept will definitely tolerate rebellions against a tyrannical ruler. The Emperor was working in the best interests of the people. Without the people’s support, the emperor had certainly failed his duties as the leader.

A Guide to the Irish Republican Army (IRA)

The Irish Republican Army (IRA), which traces its roots to Catholic Irish nationalism in the early 1900s, was considered by many to be a terrorist organization because of certain tactics—such as bombings and assassination—it used to oppose British rule in Ireland. The name IRA has been in use since the organization was founded in 1921. From 1969 through 1997, the IRA splintered into a number of organizations, all called the IRA. They included: The Official IRA (OIRA).The Provisional IRA (PIRA).The Real IRA (RIRA).Continuity IRA (CIRA). The association of the IRA with terrorism comes from the paramilitary activities of the Provisional IRA, which is no longer active. They were originally founded in 1969 when the IRA split into the Official IRA, which renounced violence, and the Provisional IRA. The IRAs Council and Home Base The IRAs home base is in Northern Ireland, with a presence and operations throughout Ireland, Great Britain, and Europe.  The IRA has always had a relatively small membership, estimated at several hundred members, organized in small, clandestine cells. Its daily operations are organized by a 7-person Army Council. Backing and Affiliations From the 1970s to the 1990s, the IRA received weapons and training from various international sources, most notably American sympathizers, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Connections have also been posited between the IRA and Marxist-leaning terrorist groups, especially at their most active in the 1970s.   The IRAs Objectives The IRA believed in the  creation of a unified Ireland under Irish, rather than British rule. PIRA used terrorist tactics to protest the Unionist/ Protestant treatment of Catholics in Northern Ireland. Political Activities The IRA is a strictly paramilitary organization. Its political wing is Sinn Fà ©in (We Ourselves, in Gaelic), a party that has represented Republican (Catholic) interests since the turn of the 20th century. When the first Irish assembly was declared in 1918 under the leadership of Sinn Fà ©in, the IRA was considered the official army of the state. Sinn Fà ©in has been a significant force in Irish politics since the 1980s. Historical Context The emergence of the Irish Republican Army has its roots in Irelands 20th-century quest for national independence from Great Britain. In 1801, the Anglican (English Protestant) United Kingdom of Great Britain merged with Roman Catholic Ireland. For the next hundred years, Catholic Irish Nationalists opposed Protestant Irish Unionists, so named because they supported the union with Great Britain. The first Irish Republican Army fought the British in the 1919 to 1921 Irish War of Independence. The Anglo-Irish treaty concluding the war divided Ireland into a Catholic Irish Free State and Protestant Northern Ireland, which became the British province, Ulster. Some elements of the IRA opposed the treaty; it was their descendants who became the terrorist PIRA in 1969. The IRA began its terrorist attacks on the British army and police following a summer of violent rioting between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. For the next generation, the IRA carried out bombings, assassinations and other terrorist attacks against British and Irish Unionist targets. Official talks between Sinn Fà ©in and the British government began in 1994  and appeared to conclude with the 1998 signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The Agreement included the IRAs commitment to disarm. PIRA strategist Brian Keenan, who had spent over a generation promoting the use of violence, was instrumental in bringing about disarmament (Keenan died in 2008). By 2006, the PIRA appeared to have made good on its commitment. However, terrorist activity by the Real IRA and other paramilitary groups continues and, as of the summer of 2006, is on the rise. In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations released a report detailing connections between the IRA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) going back to 1998.